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WHEN THE FIRST VOLVO “Canadians” rolled out of the company’s new assembly
facility in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia in the summer of 1963, the event was heralded by
Premier Robert Stanfield as the harbinger of a “New Nova Scotia”, which would
quickly vault the province to the forefront of the manufacturing age. This sentiment
was echoed by Volvo officials as well, who saw the plant as a crucial beachhead into
an important foreign market. As the earliest non-North American-owned automotive
facility built on this continent (Honda opened its first American facility in 1982), the
plant emerged as a result of the federal and Nova Scotia governments’ efforts to
actively encourage industrial development. Yet Volvo’s experiment in North America
fell far short of the governments’ lofty goals: operated as a simple assembly venture,
the facility reached a maximum production of never more than a few thousand
vehicles and employed only hundreds of workers in the province. After its initial burst
of enthusiasm, the Volvo Corporation itself exhibited a lukewarm attitude towards the
plant, providing only limited investment and support for its Canadian offspring. By
the late 1990s, overcapacity in the auto industry in Europe and North America,
reorganization of Volvo and the new realities of the quickly changing global auto
industry resulted in the parent company’s decision to close the plant. In 1999 Volvo
was purchased by Ford of the United States, allowing the company to import the cars
directly from Sweden duty-free under the 1965 Canada-United States Automotive
Products Trade Agreement (Auto Pact). A year later in 2000, this arrangement ended
with the demise of the Auto Pact at the World Trade Organization.1
The story of the Nova Scotia Volvo plant is part of the end of “national” auto
strategies and auto companies and the emergence of a world industry. The Volvo
experiment is also the story of state intervention in the Canadian auto industry from a
regional perspective. Provincial and federal government industrial policies provided
incentives to the company to locate in Nova Scotia during a particularly activist period
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of state initiatives in industrial development. The federal government’s auto policy was
shaped by determined civil servants in Ottawa who were keen to generate as much
economic activity as possible in this important sector of the Canadian economy.
Interventionist industrial policy was central to the new Liberal government of Lester
Pearson, and the creation of the 1965 Auto Pact, a key driver in encouraging
automotive production, reflected this new approach. In Halifax, provincial politicians
and policy-makers were also keen to develop Nova Scotia’s industry beyond traditional
resource extraction, and utilized the newly created Industrial Estates Limited (IEL) to
foster their activist bent. This new attitude was epitomized by the provincial
government of Robert Stanfield. The Volvo plant provides a case study of the motives
of these economic policy-makers. Volvo’s experience in Nova Scotia points to some
obvious questions: How did Volvo fare at the hands of the federal government in
comparison with the rest of the automotive industry, which was overwhelmingly
located in central Canada – principally Ontario? On balance, given that the venture
lasted for nearly four decades, could the Volvo plant be considered a successful
venture? Why did Ontario plants thrive under the Canadian state’s central automotive
policy – the Auto Pact – but the Volvo plant did not? How did the Halifax plant fit into
Volvo’s corporate strategy? In the final analysis, were the policies implemented by the
two governments to persuade Volvo to locate and remain in Nova Scotia a success?
By focusing on the impetus to create the plant and its initial years of operation, this
article attempts to provide some understanding as to why federal and provincial policy-
makers encouraged Volvo to establish in Canada and supported the plant with incentives
and tariff concessions. It also gives a brief history of the facility’s operational life and
provides some reasons as to why the plant eventually closed. In a period characterized
by the federal government’s efforts to improve Canadian industry and the economic
status of the Atlantic provinces through the creation of the departments of Industry and
Regional Economic Expansion – and similar efforts by the Nova Scotia government
such as IEL and the Voluntary Economic Planning Board – the establishment of Volvo
in Dartmouth-Halifax stands out as a fascinating case in the industrial evolution of both
Canada and the Maritimes. Although both the federal and provincial governments were
instrumental in facilitating the establishment of Volvo in Nova Scotia, the operation was
beset by numerous difficulties, including issues surrounding the plant location and
operation of the facility, a changing market that put Volvo products at a disadvantage
and the failure to achieve new or a broader range of production in the facility. In the end,
however, these problems only partially contributed to the demise of the plant. The story
of Volvo Halifax is a unique tale that illustrates the limits of 1960s-era federal and
provincial industrial development initiatives in the rapidly changing and highly
competitive global auto sector. Although instrumental in luring the plant to Nova Scotia,
limited tariff reduction measures, small-scale direct infrastructure concessions and local
boosterism could not sustain Volvo’s small Halifax operation, a reflection of changing
trade regimes, the large economies of scale required by the evolving automobile
industry and the shifting worldwide strategy pursued by Volvo by the 1990s.
Federal and Provincial Intervention in the Canadian Auto Industry:
1958-65
Although it remained a unique industrial experiment in North America for decades
– it was the first true “transplant” in the U.S. or Canada, long before the arrival of
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Japanese, German and Korean plants – the Volvo experience in Nova Scotia has
received surprisingly little scholarly treatment, especially from historians.2 Indeed,
state intervention and the auto industry has been a focus of historians and political
scientists of a number of countries almost solely on a federal or national level. During
the 1960s, governments in Canada, Brazil, Australia, Mexico and other Latin
American countries took a much more active role in their auto industries. All of these
countries shared common traits: widespread penetration by American multinational
auto companies, little or weak domestic manufacture and parts production and balance
of payments difficulties owing to its dependence on foreign automotive imports. In
response, the range of intervention by these host countries included increased local
content rules, wholesale nationalization of industry (or the threat thereof) and
innovative approaches to import substitution. These efforts met with varying levels of
success, and provide a basis for comparison of state intervention in national auto
industries.3
Between 1962 and 1965, Canadian policy-makers sought new methods to encourage
industrial development in the automotive sector, primarily through the use of duty-
remission schemes that were export incentives.4 Responding to demands for change in
the industry from workers, firms and academics, the governments of Progressive
Conservative John Diefenbaker and Liberal Lester Pearson created these programs in
an effort to spur auto industry production and solve an increasingly difficult balance-
of-payments problem. In October, 1962, the Diefenbaker Conservative government
created a special “remission plan” for automatic transmissions, an item which had been
predominantly imported by Canadian industry until that time. Manufacturers were now
forced to pay the 25 per cent duty on automatic transmissions (a measure that had not
been enforced previously), but received a 100 per cent rebate (and a 100 per cent rebate
on up to 10,000 imported engine blocks as well) for every dollar increase in the amount
of Canadian goods they exported over and above a 12-month base period. The plan
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worked well, and by the time the Liberals came to power in 1963, the rebate scheme
was having a positive impact on the industry.5
The newly elected minority Liberal government, also searching for ways by which
to reduce the massive deficit on current account goods, took aim directly at the auto
industry. In October 1963, C.M. “Bud” Drury, the minister of the newly created
Department of Industry, introduced a plan that was intended to both alleviate the
balance-of-payments burden and boost production even more than the Conservative
plan had. The Liberal’s new plan was a drastic expansion of the Conservative’s rebate
scheme. Now, for every dollar of exported goods over and above the base year,
manufacturers would be allowed to remit an equal amount on dutiable exports; the plan
was also extended to all automotive exports. It was expected to run for three years and
could, according to Drury, lead to an increase of between $150 and $200 million dollars
in exports, a substantial chunk of the expected $500 million deficit for 1963-64.6
While the Conservative plan had raised few American eyebrows, the Liberal’s
broad, far-reaching scheme provoked an immediate response. The Americans were
dismayed at the Canadian unilateral action, and chided the Canadian government that
“any measures adopted to deal with Canada’s balance-of-payments problems should
not artificially distort the pattern of trade or interfere with the normal exercise of
business judgement”. The U.S. State Department warned that American trade laws
left open the possibility that a private interest might take exception to the plan, which
could force the American government to take retaliatory measures.7 By April of 1964,
the American predictions were realized. That month, the Modine Manufacturing
Company of Racine, Wisconsin initiated a complaint with the U.S. Treasury
Department that, under U.S. trade law, the Canadian program constituted an unfair
trade advantage. Section 303 of the United States Tariff Act was a little-used clause
which had been previously invoked in only the most serious cases. It required the
government, if after finding in an investigation that a foreign government was
providing unfair “bounty” or “grant”, to slap prohibitive countervailing duties on the
products being imported. With a private corporation forcing the U.S. government’s
hand because of Canadian unilateral actions (while the Canadian government
steadfastly defended the program), relations between the two governments became
strained. Both governments quickly realized that unless they resolved the issue, a
trade war in the important automotive sector would be unavoidable.8 As a result, the
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two sides negotiated the far-reaching and innovative Auto Pact, which erased tariffs
for automotive trade between the two countries as long as each side achieved certain
requirements.
Volvo’s interaction with the Canadian state emerged parallel to and as a part of the
federal government’s automotive policy. As we shall see, Volvo asked for and
achieved special status within the Canadian government’s automotive policy and then
continued to receive special treatment under the new automotive regime that governed
automotive-state relations after 1965. Canadian state planners were willing to “bend
the rules” to ensure that Volvo could operate in this country; in exchange, the
presence of the company provided jobs and investment and promised to be a catalyst
for further industrial development.9
While this explains the federal government’s interventionist role in the auto
industry, it does not explain the efforts of Nova Scotia’s government to play a role in
luring Volvo to Nova Scotia nor the motives and policies of the Nova Scotia
government concerning provincial intervention in the auto industry. Indeed, while a
considerable body of literature has emerged on the question of federal and provincial
intervention in regional economic development in Nova Scotia and Atlantic Canada
in general, no study has explicitly addressed the auto sector.10
In 1956 Conservative Robert Stanfield won the Nova Scotia provincial election on a
platform that espoused industrial renewal based on effective state intervention in a
number of sectors in the Nova Scotia economy. Stanfield was determined to diversify
the province’s economy, which had suffered the collapse of traditional Nova Scotia
industries – especially coal. Since the end of the Second World War, Nova Scotia had
faced increasing unemployment and slowly declining economic prospects. As part of its
platform, Stanfield’s new government implemented a host of economic policies
designed to assert government planning more forcefully in directing the provincial
economy. These policies began to take a clear shape after 1960, and chief among them
were the Voluntary Planning Act of 1963, which was intended to improve business-
government communication, and IEL, the provincial development Crown corporation.11
The creation of IEL stemmed from the Stanfield government’s 1956 election
promise to create a “Nova Scotia Industrial Development Corporation”, to be financed
equally from government coffers and the public sale of shares in the company. But the
provincial development plan took a different turn, as the government feared that
selling shares to the public could cause undue complications and conflicts between
creating jobs or making profits for the company. Instead, in 1957 the government
enacted legislation to create IEL, an idea patterned upon a similar program in the
United Kingdom. The wholly owned Crown corporation was backed by a $23 million
government investment. Initially, the company was intended to build industrial parks
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to lease space to companies, but IEL also built factories for companies that leased at
rock-bottom prices. One advertisement for the company proclaimed: “Industrialists!
Have IEL finance and build your plant in Nova Scotia! The company will develop the
site of your choice, finance and build your plant, lease it to you at low rental and, if and
when you wish, sell it to you at book cost”. Eventually IEL became a direct lender to
companies, both for capital projects and for equipment.12 Volvo was an early and
longstanding beneficiary of IEL’s largesse, both in the form of loans and support for
plant, and, as we shall see, in facilitating direct subsidies for transport costs.
IEL’s first president was Frank Sobey, the scion of the supermarket chain, who was
appointed in 1957. Considered a titan amongst Nova Scotia’s business elite, Sobey
worked at the unsalaried position until 1969, during which IEL attracted numerous
business to the province, including textile, rubber, food processing and, of course,
automotive companies.13 IEL’s “philosophy and policy” as Sobey stated in a 1968
Financial Post interview, was based on four points: to maintain the interest and active
participation of prominent Nova Scotia businessmen on its board of directors, to
maintain a small but effective development and office staff, to make an aggressive
search for new manufacturing enterprises on an international scale and to keep an eye
out for Nova Scotia firms that might be able to profit from IEL. To that end, the
Crown corporation attracted companies from outside Nova Scotia and Canada and
helped a number of Nova Scotia firms through direct lending and providing facilities.
By 1968, more than 60 firms had been supported by IEL initiatives, and Sobey
boasted that nearly 10,000 jobs had resulted from IEL agreements and projects,
adding $40 million to the province’s revenue.14
In the case of Volvo, both provincial policies (IEL’s direct support for plant and
investment) and federal policies (tariff concessions) were key to attracting it to the
Dartmouth-Halifax region in the early 1960s. Yet Volvo’s decision to come to Nova
Scotia stemmed from more than just the incentives offered by the two governments.
Volvo Arrives in Canada: 1962-65
Volvo, which means “I go” in Latin, was founded in 1924 by Assar Gabrielsson
and Gustaf Larson, two employees of ball-bearings maker SKF, and it became an
independent company in 1935. From the first hand-built model in the 1920s, the
company grew impressively. By 1962 Volvo production reached over 100,000 cars,
buses and trucks at 13 facilities in Sweden employing 18,000 workers. The
company’s ethos was very conservative and focused on quality: there were only 15
different vehicle designs in Volvo’s history, the vehicles were offered in only seven
different colour choices and 11 per cent of its employees were involved with product
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inspection. As one excited Volvo Canada employee later reported, “Volvo rejects
more component parts than any other car maker in the world”.15
Volvo Canada was incorporated on 21 July 1958, a year after the first importation
of Volvos to Canada by a British Columbia firm which arranged to distribute the cars
nation-wide. After 1959 Volvo sales increased dramatically, and the company
responded by setting up its Canadian administrative headquarters in Toronto, which
established a dealer network. With the nation-wide growth in Canadian sales, in early
1962 the company began to consider setting up a plant in Canada. The company’s
president of Canadian operations, D.W. (Pat) Samuel, a New Zealander, was key to
hatching the agreement that saw Volvo arrive in Canada.16 Samuel was dispatched by
the parent company to negotiate with the federal and provincial governments towards
gaining better terms for the company to facilitate the establishment of a plant and ease
its initial production.
Samuel arrived in Ottawa in October of 1962 to begin discussions with
Diefenbaker’s Minister of Finance George Nowlan. Volvo had decided upon setting
up their operation in Nova Scotia, Samuel told Nowlan, due to the province’s relative
proximity to Sweden and its year-round ice-free ports, a prerequisite for a venture
which was to be heavily dependent on imports from the home country. The company
was keen to begin production as soon as possible, Samuel argued, but the current
content regulations for automotive production were unrealistic for an operation as
small as Volvo. Under the 1936 Tariff Act, which still governed the auto trade in
1962, the most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff rate was 17.5 per cent for all autos and
most parts. In order to gain duty-free access for imported parts, a company was
required to achieve 40 per cent Commonwealth (essentially Canadian) content for
companies producing 10,000 units, 50 per cent for companies producing between
10,000 and 20,000 units and 60 per cent for companies producing over 20,000
vehicles (see Table One) .17 In Ontario, the tariff schedule had the effect of facilitating
much Canadian production by the established U.S.-owned manufacturers, but would
be punitive for any other company in its initial production stages. For a company like
Volvo, which had the added cost of importing from the distant locale of Sweden, it
was impossible to reach the 10,000 vehicle mark in the first period of production. In
other words, without some special dispensation, Samuel argued, Volvo could not
make a go of it.
Table One
The Canadian Auto Tariff of 1936
____________________________________________________________________
Item: MFN Tariff Gen. Brit.
Tariff Pref.
438a (finished autos) 17.5% 27.5% 0
438b (products of 17.5% 30% 0
parts makers)
438c (products of 17.5% if made in Canada, free if not made 25% 0
auto makers) in Canada and car makers production is:
40% Commonwealth content if less than 10,000 cars
50% Commonwealth content if 10,000-20,000 cars
60% Commonwealth content if over 20,000 cars
438d (parts of 17.5% if made in Canada, free if not made 27.5% 0
commercial vehicles) in Canada and commercial vehicle makers production
is 40% Commonwealth content (no scale)
438f (parts not 25% 35%
included in above)
____________________________________________________________________
Source: Vincent Bladen, Report of the Royal Commission on the Automotive Industry
(Ottawa 1961) and Tom Traves, The State and Enterprise: Canadian Manufacturers
and the Federal Government, 1917-1931 (Toronto, 1979).
Moreover, Samuel informed the minister that Volvo’s initial plan was to be a bare-
bones operation, one in which the company simply reassembled partially knocked-
down (PKD) vehicles. There would be few Canadian parts added to the major vehicle
components shipped from Sweden and bolted together in Nova Scotia. The Canadian
plant would not even paint the vehicles, as the parts would arrive already coloured in
Volvo’s famous seven-colour range of choices. The operation was to employ
Canadian labour and include some Canadian parts (headlights, bumpers and perhaps
tires) but, again, the scale and size of the operation made it difficult to reach even
basic Canadian content levels. While the facility would be an important step in Nova
Scotia industrial development, Volvo in Nova Scotia was not going to be the next
Windsor, Oshawa or Oakville – at least not yet.18
Nowlan was sympathetic. As a native Nova Scotian and a “red tory,” he believed
in the utility of interventionist programs that could help areas such as his home
province.19 The Volvo idea also fit well within federal plans for the entire Canadian
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While Volvo could not take advantage of the transmission/engine program (the
company did not yet have facilities in Canada), Nowlan was eager to find some relief
for Volvo so that it could begin production in Canada. Thus, the company was granted
a number of tariff concessions from the Diefenbaker government to ease their way
into production, as Volvo represented a “special case” that involved the establishment
of new enterprise in Canada. In return for assurances that Volvo train 500 Canadians
as mechanics and hire at least 400 workers at their new plant, the company received
remission of duties on bodies, engines and parts through a process similar to the
transmission/engine program. The company’s Canadian content requirements were to
be slowly increased as Volvo adapted to the Canadian market.22 In Nowlan’s view,
Volvo gained the benefit of “temporary tariff arrangements”, and would be
“increasing their purchases in Canada quite quickly once they become well
established”. Initially, Volvo was allowed to begin production with virtually no
Canadian content while importing their parts duty-free.23
Samuel also held talks with the Nova Scotia government regarding the Volvo plan.
In September and October of 1962, Samuel met with IEL President Frank Sobey, IEL
General Manager R.W. Manuge and Nova Scotia Minister of Trade and Industry E.A.
Manson in Toronto and Montreal to make his case. Samuel made it clear that the
company’s decision hinged on two factors. First, the company needed to ensure that
it received a preferential rail shipping rate for Volvo cars from Halifax to Toronto and
Montreal. Current freight rates, argued Samuel, were far too expensive for the
company to profitably transport their vehicles to the lucrative central Canadian
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market. Second, Volvo would not come to Nova Scotia unless it received a favourable
loan to secure an appropriate facility in Halifax or Dartmouth. The two issues, Samuel
hinted, were linked.24
Provincial government and IEL officials were eager to facilitate the company’s
arrival, which would provide a significant boost to Nova Scotia manufacturing. While
trade minister Manson stated that the provincial government had no authority with rail
shipping rates, IEL’s participation could circumvent any problems. After bringing the
issue to the attention of the federal cabinet, meeting with Canadian National Railways
representatives to seek the lowest price possible and presenting the idea to the IEL
board, it was decided that IEL propose to pay a “partial indemnity” to subsidize the
shipment of vehicles to central Canada. On 22 January 1963, the Nova Scotia Cabinet
approved the partial indemnity, which was also approved by the IEL board the next
day. Through IEL, Nova Scotians would subsidize the transportation of Volvo cars
from the Halifax/Dartmouth plant to the tune of $9.67 for every vehicle shipped to
Toronto and $9.33 for every one shipped to Montreal. The indemnity for shipping
Volvo cars westward was capped at $150,000 over the next three years – thereafter, it
was to be open-ended, a considerable expense if Volvo were to expand its production,
but one that IEL and the government were willing to bear if the facility took off as
they hoped.25
The site for a plant was also to be supported by Nova Scotia tax dollars through the
granting of loans to the company to secure a facility. Samuel and company
representatives investigated a number of sites in late 1962, and decided that Halifax-
Dartmouth was the best location: since the company was dependent on shipments
from Sweden, and Halifax was the closest major North American port to Sweden, it
made sense to locate there.26 The city’s good road and port infrastructure also helped
to convince Volvo. In January 1963 Samuel informed IEL that the company had
leased a 55,000 sq. ft. dockside former sugar refinery owned by Acadia Sugar
Refineries Co. in Dartmouth for $2 million for three years. For its part, IEL loaned the
company funds for the lease at very favourable terms (8 per cent) until a plant could
be built “to order” by the Crown corporation.27 The new Volvo facility was little more
than a converted warehouse. With the rail transportation issue and lease with IEL
worked out, Volvo began working closely with Nova Scotia trade minister Manson to
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identify Nova Scotia companies as potential suppliers.28
Halifax was also ideal because of its lower labour costs, especially in comparison
to those in the traditional Canadian automotive-producing communities in Ontario.
Volvo officials were well aware that the average hourly industrial wage in Halifax in
1963 was $1.86 while the average hourly wage of a GM worker in Oshawa was
between $2.16 and $2.29.29 Thus, Nova Scotia’s proximity to Sweden was not the
only locational benefit bestowed upon the company as the Halifax location would
produce a significant labour cost advantage. By February 1963, Canadians were being
trained in Sweden in anticipation of the plant’s opening.30
On 21 February 1963, the announcement of Volvo’s Nova Scotia plant was made
simultaneously in Halifax and Ottawa. Publicly, Samuel and the company enunciated
a number of reasons for Volvo’s decision to locate in Nova Scotia. In interviews with
the financial press, Samuel stated that Volvo’s move was because of the potential for
both the market in Canada and production in Nova Scotia: “The main one is that we
think we have a car that is suitable for the Canadian market and Canadian conditions
. . . . I also believe that to sell a car in volume in Canada you must build it in Canada”.
He also saw a “growing nationalistic spirit” among Canadians, and that the plan was
an “experiment” for the parent company.31 Samuel boldly predicted that the plant
would produce 5,000 vehicles in its first year and 7,500 in its second. Dartmouth
Mayor I.W. Akerley’s efforts in the final negotiations was also pointed out by Samuel
as being pivotal to Volvo’s decision to locate in the area as was the help of the
provincial government – especially IEL.32 While he did not mention IEL’s role in
facilitating the export of Volvo cars to central Canada, Samuel did state that Halifax’s
excellent rail connections to central Canada and the eastern United States had played
a role in the company’s decision.33
Other Volvo company officials were equally enthusiastic at the new facility’s
prospects. “You must appreciate the fact”, stated Jan Nytzen, a Volvo controller, “that
in Sweden we are regarded as a conservative company. We are not given to
flamboyant promotions or ideas. Yes, most certainly we are serious about our
Canadian operations. We hope we are here to stay, and grow”.34 Gunnar Engellau,
Chairman and Managing Director of Volvo, explained in February 1963: “We are
establishing our first overseas factory in Nova Scotia because we like the environment
very much. Everybody is so enthusiastic there – and that is important. Your
government has given us good co-operation. You have an excellent year-round
harbour. And the labour situation is very attractive”. Moreover, market factors were
also a part of the decision. “We have chosen Canada”, said Engellau, “because we
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have the kind of cars that should give us special standing there – and because, too, I
have always had a strong feeling for Canadians”. 35
The Volvo announcement sparked a burst of Nova Scotia pride. Volvo’s arrival
was likened to an “economic miracle” by Stanfield in the legislature, an event he
“could hardly believe. . . . For years we have all dreamed of something like this, and
now the dream has become a reality”.36 The Halifax Chronicle-Herald also captured
the spirit unleashed by the announcement: “All Nova Scotians should rejoice in the
good fortune of Dartmouth, chosen yesterday as the location for a branch assembly
plant of the giant Swedish car manufacturer, Volvo”.37 Volvo’s Samuel heralded the
choice of Nova Scotia as a testament to the “inherent traditions of quality of
workmanship dating back to Nova Scotia’s period of eminence as one of the world’s
biggest builders of wooden ships”. Nova Scotia was, according to Samuel, “The
cradle of Canadian craftsmanship”.38 Samuel himself was feted by the Chronicle-
Herald as a man of “confidence” who helped embody the spirit that Volvo was
bringing to Nova Scotia.39
Editorialists also praised the federal government and its helpful co-operation with
the province: “There is plain evidence that there exists an effective co-operation
between federal and provincial development authorities, as a result of which restless,
searching capital may be convinced that investment here is worthwhile”. There was
praise too for the federal Minister of Finance: “Mr. Nowlan . . . who negotiated the
temporary tariff concessions which make attractive the importation of the semi-
finished product from Sweden, has demonstrated once again the necessity and
desirability of public incentives for private enterprise”. The Volvo announcement also
justified IEL and the lease-back principle: “For all its criticism levelled at it from time
to time, [IEL] remains the most effective self-help organization that we in Nova
Scotia have yet established”.40 The sentiment was echoed in the legislature, where
Stanfield stated: “Volvo’s decision to come to Nova Scotia will cause many
industrialists, whom we have not yet been able to interest in Nova Scotia, to look
seriously at our province now”.41
The official opening of the Dartmouth plant in June 1963 was a colourful affair.
Dignitaries in attendance included Stanfield, the president of Volvo, Gunnar Engellau,
and even Prince Bertil, the eldest son of Sweden’s king, who cut the ceremonial
ribbon and led dancers at a formal ball. Stanfield was heralded as the founder of a
“New Nova Scotia”, and the booming Swedish presence personified by the Volvo
endeavour was not lost upon the premier. During the ceremony, Stanfield joked that
the province’s name should be changed to “New Sweden”. The plant represented what
a visiting American economist saw as a “Second Wind” for the province, a spurt of
industrialization which would compel Nova Scotia to the front ranks of Canadian
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industrial development.42 Volvo’s presence was increasingly being seen as “not only
an economic boost but a psychological lift” for the Halifax region, Nova Scotia and
the Maritimes. Volvo management stated that the future was bright for the facility and
that there was “no limit to our expansion possibilities”. Privately, Volvo
representatives hinted to IEL officials that the company intended to have other
products besides autos built at the facility, and that Volvo might be “coming to us
soon to arrange for a permanent plant”.43
Stanfield himself was presented with the very first Volvo that rolled out of the
Dartmouth plant. He turned the vehicle over to the government and then purchased
another Nova Scotia-built Volvo for his own use and suggested other cabinet
ministers do the same “to set an example for the province”.44 Some of them took
Stanfield up on the suggestion: the Financial Post reported that at least one Nova
Scotia cabinet minister, future premier G.I. Smith, purchased a vehicle from the
company and stated “I regard it as a Nova Scotian product”.45
The arrival of Volvo prompted an economic mini-boom in the region. Within
weeks of Volvo’s start-up, a number of other automotive and automotive-related
companies announced their intentions to establish operations in Halifax, including
Continental Can Co. and Surrette Battery.46 Within months, William Docsteader, sales
manager for the company, stated publicly that he expected many different firms to
follow Volvo to Dartmouth. The company’s move to the area was, in his opinion, not
only big news in Canada, but “big news all over the world”.47 In an effort to spur such
growth, Volvo worked with Nova Scotia trade minister Manson to organize a Volvo-
oriented trade show for prospective firms to understand the company’s supplier
needs.48
Volvo’s arrival also generated interest from other non-North American auto
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companies about the possibility of setting up facilities in the province. In March 1963,
IEL General Manager R.W. Manuge quietly held talks with Reneault and Peugot, and
the province was actively recruiting Toyota through Canadian Motor Industries
Limited, an outfit fronted by Toronto entrepreneur Peter Munk, which was also trying
to establish auto assembly in the province.49 In April it was reported that the United
Kingdom’s main auto association, the Society of Manufacturer’s and Traders Limited
(SMMTL), was canvassing Nova Scotia locations for potential future sites. While the
Volvo move had turned some heads in Europe, a 10 per cent surcharge on European
imports by the Diefenbaker government had also generated newfound interest by
British companies in Volvo-like knock-down operations in Canada.50
Notwithstanding the initial enthusiasm for the prospects of the Volvo plant and the
development it might generate, the plant’s beginnings were humble. The first crew of
Volvo Nova Scotians received 12-weeks training. None had any experience in
automotive assembly, yet many had backgrounds as mechanics. Assembly operated
on a one-station system as opposed to a fully automated assembly line.51 Only 5 of the
first 100 employees were from Sweden. Initially, the company produced 15 to 20
vehicles a day. The company assembled imported body shells from Sweden, which
were matched with Canadian-assembled Swedish engines and mechanical parts plus
some parts supplied by Canadian manufacturers.52
Although it was a relatively small operation (especially in comparison to the Ontario
facilities of the Big Three U.S. manufacturers), the United Auto Workers was keen to
organize the facility; in September 1963 the company and the union reached a three-
year agreement that was ratified by 98 per cent of the workers in the plant and created
UAW Local 720. Although the UAW did not achieve wage parity for the Dartmouth
plant’s workers with those in Ontario, as it had originally hoped, the initial contract did
produce good results in wages and benefits for the first Volvo workers.53 In December
1963, six months after the first two-and four-door Volvo “Canadians” rolled out of the
warehouse, Canadian content in the Dartmouth-assembled Volvos, including labour,
reached 30 per cent, while production went from 55 to 66 cars a week.54
By then, the new Pearson government had announced its expanded duty-remission
scheme, which allowed automotive companies to boost their imports if they exported
more of their products. The plan was aimed at the U.S.-owned companies in Ontario,
which were importing massive amounts of parts for use in their Canadian plants.
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Volvo, with its parent company in Sweden, could also take advantage of the expanded
remission scheme, and was actually the first company to do so. In late November
1963, Volvo Canada announced that its parent firm would purchase $100,000 worth
of rear axles from Hayes Steel Products of Thorold, Ontario; this purchase allowed
Volvo Canada to import duty-free a corresponding amount from its home country.55
The company quickly took advantage of the U.S. market under the scheme as well.
Gunnar Engellau, president of parent company AB Volvo, who appeared at the
Dartmouth grand opening, stated that the company was “definitely interested in the
export market”. He was hopeful that the company could develop a market for its
Canadian-built cars among Commonwealth countries, and that the Nova Scotia plant
would produce for the U.S. market.56 In December 1963 Volvo Canada announced
that 75 Volvos would be sold in New England. Although Volvo already sold 18,000
vehicles in the U.S., Canadian sourcing was seen as a way to boost production in
Canada and a way to save on tariffs by taking advantage of the export-incentive nature
of the duty-remission scheme. Moreover, Volvo had faced continuous product
shortages in the United States.57
Table Two
Volvo Canada, Production and Sales, 1960-65
____________________________________________________________________
Year Production Sales
1960 – 1,090
1961 – 1,949
1962 – 1,959
1963 1,139 2,040
1964 2,683 2,683
1965 3,353 3,156
____________________________________________________________________
Source: “Volvo Output, Sales Climbing”, Financial Post, 22 January 1966.
Notwithstanding the initial production increases and potential for the export
market in the U.S., Volvo’s output in Canada fell far from the company’s early,
optimistic predictions of Volvo Canada President D.W. Samuel. Instead of 5,000
vehicles in 1963 and 7,500 in 1964, Dartmouth had not even broken the 4,000 vehicle
mark by 1965. By June 1965, Canadian content was up to approximately 40 per cent
and Volvo was producing 75 cars per week, boosting its annual production to 3,500
cars.58 Employment, which had originally been targeted at 300-400, had stalled at 101
Volvo in Halifax 17
55 “Vovlo order for Hayes Steel under new auto parts plan”, Financial Post, 30 November 1963.
56 Chisholm, “Maritimes’ ‘New Sweden’”, Financial Post, 15 June 1963.
57 After 1965, however, Volvo was unable to ship cars from its Halifax plant due to tariff rules under
the Auto Pact. See “Volvo, too, plan export of Canadian cars to U.S.”, Financial Post, 21 December
1963.
58 “Second Company to Assemble Cars”, Financial Post, 26 June 1965.
employees. Faced with the difficulties of slow production and disappointed
expectations, the company also faced the uncertainty created by a significantly altered
automotive trade and regulatory regime after 1965.
Volvo Under the Auto Pact, 1965-95
On 16 January 1965 Prime Minister Lester Pearson and President Lyndon Johnson
signed the Canada-United States Automotive Products Trade Agreement at Johnson’s
“L.B.J. Ranch” in Texas.59 The agreement aimed to rationalize the North American
industry for the benefit of producers and consumers alike, cement the strong
continental ties and spirit of cooperation between the two countries and resolve a
difficult issue in the U.S.-Canadian trade relationship. The creation of the Auto Pact
was precipitated by the unilateral Canadian efforts in 1962-64 to boost Canada’s
flagging auto industry and redress its rapidly deteriorating current account balance, a
deficit that was largely the result of massive auto and parts imports from the United
States. When the U.S. and Canadian governments realized that the issue might
deteriorate into a full-fledged trade war between the two countries, negotiations began
in earnest.60
By the fall of 1964, the two sides came to an agreement. Duty-free trade in autos and
parts was to be limited only by the different provisions governing each country. The
agreement stipulated that imports to the U.S. could come only from Canada and
required 50 per cent North American content. In Canada, only certain bona fide
manufacturers that maintained a ratio of production to sales and a base Canadian value-
added rate were allowed to import from any country, though the U.S. was the most
likely country of origin. This intergovernmental agreement was complemented by a
series of agreements between the Canadian government and the U.S.-owned Canadian
subsidiaries of the major auto producers referred to as “letters of undertaking”. The
companies promised to boost their investments in Canada over the next three years and
to increase the Canadian content of their production by 60 per cent of whatever increase
might occur in their sales in a given year.61 Instead of unrestricted free trade, the Auto
Pact provided for a tightly managed limited sectoral trade area in autos and parts.
As the two governments and the American Big Three auto makers had been the
instigators of the new agreement, it was primarily designed to benefit the U.S.-based
companies, largely to the exclusion of offshore manufacturers. While the Canadian
government consulted extensively with the Canadian Big Three presidents, Volvo’s
representatives did not participate in the Auto Pact discussions. But with Volvo in
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mind, the Auto Pact did include a part which stipulated that the government of Canada
could designate a manufacturer “not falling within the categories” in the Annex as
being entitled to duty-free treatment. This allowed the government to designate Volvo
under the agreement at a 40 per cent Canadian value-added (CVA) rate (being the
dollar amount of Canadian labour or parts added to a vehicle), which was in keeping
with the company’s previous content commitments and did not preclude the
company’s participation in the new regime.62
Although the new agreement provided immense benefits for GM, Ford and
Chrysler, as they could now import and export across the border tariff free as long as
they maintained their commitments in Canada and content requirements in the U.S.,
Volvo would benefit as well. The company could now import duty-free from Sweden,
as the Canadian negotiators had ensured that the Canadian aspects of the agreement
applied to third countries. In other words, Volvo could import parts from Sweden
duty-free if they continued to maintain their Auto Pact commitments. This meant
massive savings, and provided an opportunity for further growth as long as Volvo
increased its Canadian presence.63
In its first years of operation, the Auto Pact proved to be immensely successful as
expansion in the auto sector was impressive. The main players in the industry, the
American Big Three, expanded their facilities greatly in the period immediately
following the agreement’s signing. One Department of Industry official estimated that
of the over 50 major automotive-related projects announced by October of 1965,
nearly half were by subsidiaries of U.S. companies. The official noted that in many
instances, the companies specifically declared that the reason for the growth was the
automotive agreement, though many had been planned before 1965 because of
growing Canadian demand.64 During the first two years of the Auto Pact, every major
manufacturer, including Volvo, opened or expanded at least one major facility in
Canada, which accounted for much of the $260 million target in the letters of
undertaking.65 By the late 1960s, the Big Three had all boosted production and
increased their investments. In 1969, the Canadian auto industry produced over one
million vehicles for the first time, a massive increase over the 325,000 total vehicles
produced in 1960.
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Nonetheless, companies did have problems meeting their commitments under the
agreement. A slowdown in the U.S. market threatened to cool the expected export
programs of all the manufacturers.66 Volvo, too, faced difficulties, although its
problems were of a different nature. In late 1965, Volvo Canada sought permission
from the government to alter its original commitments. Because of the company’s
particular circumstances, the government’s requirements under the letters of
undertaking signed by the company were less than that expected of the Big Three.
While it needed to maintain its ratio of sales to production and CVA for the base year
of 1963-64, Volvo was only required to increase its additional CVA by 40 per cent of
the growth in its market, as opposed to the 60 per cent expectation placed upon the
Big Three. Moreover, the company’s expected additional investment by 1967-68 was
only $600,000 (compared to the $228 million expected by the Big Three). With the
downturn in the Canadian demand for Volvo products, which matched the U.S.
slowdown, the company hoped to lessen the government’s requirements.
At the end of 1965, the company informed government officials that they would
only achieve their targets if they engaged in “uneconomic practices” and that they
would not meet their growth targets unless they received some concessions from the
government.67 In response, Drury informed company officials that the government
agreed in February 1966 to some changes in its requirements. Although Volvo was
required to maintain the production to sales ratio and the base CVA, the government
loosened the Canadian content and additional CVA expectations. Instead of 40 per
cent Canadian content, Drury informed Volvo president Karl Kohler the company
would be allowed to hit a 25 per cent Canadian content target by July 1966, which
would rise annually by 5 per cent so that the 40 per cent figure would be achieved by
31 July 1969. The government also agreed to allow Volvo to invest its additional
$600,000 by the end of July 1969.68
While the tariff relief was welcomed by the company, continued disappointing
production figures sparked stories that Volvo intended to flee to greener pastures.
Compounding these rumours was the fact the company’s lease at the Atlantic Sugar
Refineries Plant was expiring in 1967 and that the company did not wish to renew the
lease with Volvo.69 Moving the company’s head office to Toronto in 1966, and setting
up a major parts depot at a new $1.2 million facility in Toronto, did not help matters.
In early 1966 Volvo Canada President Kohler was forced to quell rumours that the
company was moving to Quebec; he publicly stated the company was eager to remain
in Nova Scotia.70
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Volvo did move, but only to a new facility across the harbour from Dartmouth.
After difficult deliberations over choosing a new site and a host of false starts, in 1966
Volvo took possession of a new and larger plant on Halifax’s Pier 9. Built by IEL and
leased to Volvo, the facility was a 190,000 sq. ft., $1 million investment by the Crown
corporation.71 Incentive was further provided by the Halifax City Council, which
offered a 10-year tax-benefit package. The plant’s location allowed Volvo to load
shipments directly into the facility.72 Again, this move by Volvo was heralded as a
signal that the company was in Nova Scotia to stay, although the company did not
own the building outright.
By 1968 Volvo, like the rest of the industry in Canada, had improved its position.
That year, the new plant produced nearly 5,000 Volvo 140 Series vehicles and had
increased turnout from 360 cars a month to over 420; in November, in fact, the
company boosted production at the Halifax facility from 120 to 130 cars a week.
However, this optimism for Volvo’s prospects did not stop company president Kohler
from reminding Nova Scotia Premier G.I. Smith that the plant required provincial
assistance “to further strengthen our position in Canada, and thereby create more jobs
and opportunities for your area”.73
The company’s request for further assistance was realized when Volvo officials
informed government representatives in 1968 that another expansion was necessary
due to the growth in demand for Volvo cars in the Canadian market. The request was
accompanied by the threat of departure: Volvo’s Kohler informed IEL board members
that “we realize that IEL and NHB [National Harbour Commission, the co-owner of
the Pier 9 facility] have done their utmost in the past to keep Volvo in the Maritimes,
but if expansion space cannot be provided now or in the future, we must take a closer
look at our future growth potential elsewhere in Canada”.74 After considering a
proposal that would have seen a new facility of either 20,000-vehicle or 50,000-
vehicle capacity production built somewhere else in the Halifax area, the company
asked for loans to expand their present Pier 9 facility by 60,000 sq. ft., and this was
authorized by IEL in 1970.75 With the Pier 9 expansion, annual production capacity at
Halifax expanded to 15,000 vehicles. Although they did not pursue an entirely new
facility, the company’s fortunes seemed to be positive: employment had expanded to
over 300 people and, in January 1971, the plant launched production of the new Volvo
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industrial space (they were looking for a 90-acre site with potential to grow a further 45 acres). The
142E, the first computer-controlled fuel-injected car in North America. In August, the
40,000th vehicle produced by Volvo in Halifax rolled out of the plant.76
Nonetheless, rumours continued to persist that the plant’s position was precarious,
a situation which was exacerbated by labour difficulties. In 1974 UAW Local 720, in
a strike position following the end of their contract, were locked out by the company
after negotiations broke off over the issue of overtime rates. Volvo representatives
made it clear to Nova Scotia officials that they could not operate the facility under the
overtime provisions being demanded by the union; Volvo executives were, in the
view of IEL President Dean Salsman, “very disturbed and concerned about the
negotiations”.77
IEL and government representatives were not sympathetic to the union’s position, and
went to great lengths to show that Volvo’s employees were paid as well as their
counterparts in central Canada. They feared that further labour disruptions would lead to
the company’s always-rumoured departure from Halifax, prompting development
minister George Mitchell to admit to Minister of Labour Walter Fitzgerald: “We are
always very concerned about this organization and are afraid that if they suspect that they
will have many more labour difficulties they may well close down their operation”.78
IEL’s Salsman was even more blunt: “I am wondering whether the international union
representative, doing the negotiations for the Volvo employees, is negotiating in their
best interest”.79 Salsman also lamented the influence of Ontario in the negotiations:
noting that the union was demanding “more than the [B]ig-[T]hree are paying in the
Windsor area”, Salsman felt that it was “unfortunate that someone from another province
can dictate the conditions for a plant in Nova Scotia”.80 In the end, Volvo and the union
reached a compromise and the plant reopened after a 13-week labour disruption.81
Along with labour disputes, the early 1970s brought missed opportunities at Volvo.
In late 1971 the Department of National Defence informed Nova Scotia Minister of
Development Ralph Fiske that the army had purchased two Volvo trucks to be tested
as part of its plan to replace 3,000 aging three-quarter tonne trucks. When the news
became public in mid-1973, Volvo officials pressed IEL and Nova Scotia government
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representatives, who in turn attempted to influence federal officials, particularly those
Members of Parliament from Nova Scotia such as Allan MacEachen, to ensure that
Volvo be chosen for the contract. Such an order would mean an expansion of the
Volvo facility to begin producing trucks (perhaps on a permanent basis, hinted Volvo
officials), and two to three years of employment for 80-100 additional workers.82
Nova Scotia pressure, while not falling on deaf ears, was ineffective in securing the
contract for Volvo. Although MacEachen assured provincial Minister of
Development George Mitchell “I will watch this matter very closely and do what I can
to be of assistance”, the army chose Chrysler products for the project. The decision
was bitter for provincial and IEL officials: IEL President Dean Salsman complained
that federal Industry Minister Alastair Gillespie took “a very casual approach” to the
province’s concerns. Mitchell complained that Gillespie was uncooperative and failed
to give the province “any real information” on the contract. In the end, provincial and
Volvo officials were informed that the contract was based on the military’s desire to
use a standard North American commercial vehicle for logistical and financial
reasons. Such a contract would have improved the long-term fortunes of the plant
facility, and the loss was a significant blow the plant’s prospects.83
One factor that had led to the loss of the military truck contract was Volvo’s lack
of Canadian content in its vehicles, a significant criteria stipulated by the army for the
truck order. After 1965, the Volvo operations continued to have difficulties in
achieving substantial levels of Canadian content (including labour); it steadily
decreased, hitting a very low 20 per cent by 1970. Little of the in-vehicle content was
from Nova Scotia sources, and much of this was due to the company’s very high
quality standards and low-price demands. For example, in 1970 the company
informed the provincial government that of the few Canadian items used in the cars,
they were now purchasing 75 per cent of their batteries from Ontario due to the lower
prices. Nova Scotia-based Surrette Battery Co., which had been heralded in the 1960s
as a success story linked to the Volvo enterprise, could no longer compete on quality
or price.84 Other local companies, such as Bluenose Woodworkers, Maritime Canvas
Converters and Halifax Metalworkers had also lost contracts or been rejected because
of poor quality or an inability to meet the company’s price demands. The Volvo
operation’s small scale also curtailed Canadian content: in some instances, local
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companies were not interested in the short production runs that were typical of a
Volvo order.85
A number of other problems beyond the plant’s control hindered its operation during
the early 1970s. A 1971 report from the Centre for Automobile Safety in Washington,
DC claiming that Volvo’s cars were not as safe as advertised was widely publicized,
and prompted the Halifax Mail-Star to question the reliability of Volvo Canada
vehicles.86 In its critique of Volvo safety, the paper also erroneously stated that the
company was receiving “advances” from IEL. In response, Volvo Canada strenuously
defended the quality of its cars and the integrity of its workforce, and vehemently
repudiated the assertion that it had received any inappropriate “advances”.87 In the fall
of 1973 a strike that closed the Port of Halifax led to production delays and the eventual
closure of the Volvo plant for two weeks in November.88 Both incidents added to the
difficulties the company faced during that period.
Notwithstanding these setbacks, in 1975 the company reached its peak production
and assembled more than 13,000 units (see Table Three). For the remainder of the
decade, the plant produced between 7,000 and 12,500 vehicles every year.89 By 1980,
while the rest of the automotive industry was in the depths of a severe recession,
Volvo representatives were cautiously optimistic of the plant’s long-term prospects.
Although output usually remained less than 10,000 vehicles per year, Volvo’s sales in
Canada were increasing, which led to further production increases and underlined the
importance of consistent output to meet that domestic demand.90
Table Three
Volvo Production in Canada, 1970-98
____________________________________________________________________
1970 8,200 1981 8,594 1990 8,062
1971 8,281 1982 10,165 1991 8,095
1972 9,448 1983 10,378 1992 6,288
1973 10,449 1984 10,438 1993 5,504
1974 10,082 1985 10,078 1994 6,436
1975 13,337 1986 10,390 1995 7,588
1976 9,487 1987 8,523 1996 7,283
1977 6,826 1988 6,572 1997 6,548
1978 8,199 1989 8,004 1998 8,373
____________________________________________________________________
Source: Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, 1999.
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By the mid-1980s, however, Volvo Canada was producing only a fraction of what
had been expected in 1963. In-vehicle Canadian content was barely five per cent and
the vast majority of the Canadian value added at the Halifax plant resulted from labour
costs. Ironically, tires from Michelin, which had been the other significant provincial
effort to attract new industry to the province, were used on Nova Scotia Volvos – but
they were imported from Germany rather than being delivered from the province’s
own plants in Pictou County and Bridgewater.91
This lack of content curtailed Volvo exports from Halifax to the United States.
While Canadian officials gave the company preferential treatment to import from
Sweden without achieving its content requirements, it was prohibited from exporting
to the U.S. if it did not achieve a 50 per cent “North American Content” threshold,
which it never attained. As a result, the company was unable to use Halifax as a source
for exports to the U.S. which, by the mid-1970s, had become its largest market. To
alleviate this difficulty, amid great fanfare in 1974 the company broke ground on a
US$100 million plant in Virginia that was intended to produce 100,000 vehicles and
employ 3,500 workers within two years. Yet by 1976 the partially completed plant
was still not producing vehicles, a victim of the recession in the auto industry and
increased prices for Volvo products that slowed sales. The plant was virtually
abandoned until the early 1980s, when the company decided to source bus production
at the facility. This venture soon fell on hard times as the bus market became
increasingly competitive and crowded. In 1986, after building 120 buses, Volvo
announced that it would cease production at the site; by the next year the plant was
empty.92
A new Halifax plant did not really provide the production that was necessary for
the Canadian market either. In 1987 Volvo and IEL announced that the company
would leave the Halifax plant at Pier 9 to move to an entirely new facility constructed
at a cost of $13.5 million by Volvo at Bayer Lake Industrial Park. Volvo’s move was
sweetened by further tax breaks given by the municipal government, which required
the company to pay only a fraction of its municipal tax bill for the next ten years.
While some municipal councillors voiced concern about the continuing breaks for the
company, especially after it was reported that Volvo Canada had been increasingly
profitable during the 1980s, the municipal measures passed with little dissent.93
During the move to the new facility, Volvo planned to reduce its workforce, which led
to further labour difficulties at the plant as a wildcat strike ensued. Production reached
near-record lows, and Volvo workers recall the move with bitterness.94 Their
bitterness would reach a breaking point only a few years later. By the mid-1990s, the
company faced new challenges in its North American strategy – one which required
drastic changes to its Halifax plant.
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The End of Volvo’s Canadian Adventure, 1995-98
On 8 September 1998, Volvo announced that it was closing the Bayer Lake
assembly plant, stating that it was no longer “economically viable” to produce cars in
Halifax for the Canadian market. Volvo Canada President Gord Sonnenberg stated
that the facility was simply too small for the long-term plans of the company. A plant
that produced less than 10,000 vehicles was no match for one that produced over
100,000.95 Moreover, the company argued that economies of scale were key to their
tariff concerns. Even with the 6.1 per cent Canadian tariff for complete vehicles, it
was still more efficient to build the cars in Sweden at the large-scale plants and ship
them to Canada. This was particularly true for the U.S. export market. The closure
also provoked rumours that Volvo was in greater financial trouble than the company
was letting on and that the Halifax facility was being shuttered in part to address its
over-capacity problems in Europe.96 There was also speculation that the company was
being pursued as a takeover target.
Reaction to the announcement was one of resignation. While many Haligonians
lamented the departure of the company – another Swedish firm, Ikea, had just left the
Halifax area – the province and city were keen to downplay the significance of the
move. Nova Scotia Development Minister Manning MacDonald stated that the city
was “buoyant” enough to take care of itself, while Halifax Mayor Walter Fitzgerald
immediately set about to create a task force to consider options for the 223 employees
who would lose their jobs.97
In the wake of the closure announcement, management-worker relations came to a
boil after the company offered a severance package that was deemed unacceptable by
the employees. A 31-year veteran at the plant stated: “It’s sad that a company which
demanded so much loyalty from its workers has so little to offer in return”. He felt
that the company’s initial severance offer would have cut his pension practically in
half. In response, the workers occupied the plant in October 1998. In the words of
Larry Wark of the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) union, “The frustration has been
building up and building up, so finally the decision was made this week that people
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_____________________________________________________________________________________
Region Plants 1997 1998 1999
Sweden Goethenburg 116,100 86,000 107,007
Uddevalla
Belgium Ghent 145,200 151,700 151,350
Netherlands Born 115,000 150,900 132,000
Canada Halifax 6,600 8,400 —M
South-East Asia Kuala Lumpur 4,000 700 2,600
(Malaysia)
Sumutprakam
(Thailand)
Total 387,400 398,500 392,957
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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1998.
97 Editorial, “Filling the Volvo Void”, Chronicle-Herald, 11 September 1998.
were tired of waiting, tired of being stalled. Most of them were concerned that we’d
get too far down the line, and Volvo would just get all its good cars out, get them into
the marketplace and at any point in time, tell us that bargaining would never begin
again. So the decision was made to occupy the plant”.98
The Volvo workforce in Halifax ended its takeover of the plant and removed a
blockade at the main gates after the CAW’s negotiating team announced it had
reached a tentative agreement with management on pension and severance packages.
The CAW had dispatched a mission to Sweden to try to save the plant, but it had been
unsuccessful. Instead, the union negotiated better terms surrounding the pension and
severance agreements and the workers returned to work peacefully. On 11 December
1998, the last Volvo assembled in Canada, a four-door S70 sedan, quietly rolled out
of the facility and was donated to the IWK Grace Health Centre by the company and
the workers.
Why did the Volvo venture in Canada, which had begun with such optimism and
enthusiasm, end so sadly? The project, which was heralded as representing the start
of a “New Nova Scotia” in 1963, ended with an unhappy and very public labour
dispute and plant takeover. How did a venture which had the benefit of federal and
provincial programs to spur industrial development come to such an ignominious
end? Notwithstanding the plant’s uneven existence, on balance can Volvo’s Canadian
venture be considered a success?
Some have viewed the story of Volvo in Canada as an example of corporate
exploitation. Critics of the company argue that “Volvo did not ‘bring a little bit of
Sweden’ to Nova Scotia; instead the company quickly adapted to and exploited the
peripheral conditions of its new location”.99 The company took advantage of a
weakened economic jurisdiction and lower labour costs, and gained the benefit of
preferential treatment in tariff, capital and infrastructure policies from federal and
provincial governments – all in exchange for the promise of booming employment
and increased industrial development. But that promise never materialized. Volvo
never employed more than 200 people directly in the plant; its partial-knock-down
system resulted in few secondary jobs in either parts or assembly; the plant produced
barely 10,000 vehicles in an average year, a shadow of the over 100,000 vehicles
produced at Volvo’s European operations.
Others might compare the shortcomings at Volvo in Nova Scotia with the success
of other assembly facilities in Ontario, and place the blame at the feet of a central
Canadian-oriented federal government. After all, provincial representatives often felt
slighted at the hands of the federal government when it came to government contracts
– such as the military truck order – or felt that Ontario conditions were dictating the
terms of Nova Scotia labour. When Volvo announced the Halifax closure, local
reporters noted that the executives came to the press conference “with their Ontario
public relations experts in tow”.100 Criticism towards the federal government,
however, or its automotive policy could not be too harsh. After all, Volvo had been
included in the Auto Pact, something not even the Honda and Toyota facilities in
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Ontario could boast.101 Furthermore, Volvo had been given preferential tariff
treatment by the federal government from the outset and had even gained further
concessions under the Auto Pact. Instead, when it came to federal automotive policy,
Volvo’s status as a “regional” producer actually resulted in beneficial treatment.
Volvo’s demise was not a result of regional discrimination in favour of Ontario.
The end of Volvo’s Canadian venture can also be seen as a failure in corporate
strategy. Although Volvo was keen to exploit a new market, it never committed
adequate resources to the plant or made a concerted financial investment in the
Halifax operation. Such an effort may have paid off in far greater sales in Canada and
a significant growth in Volvo’s overseas market, but the company’s managers were
unwilling to commit wholeheartedly to their Canadian facility. Volvo’s reluctance to
boost its facility in Canada contrasted sharply with the Canadian Big Three plants in
Ontario and Quebec, particularly after 1965: the GM, Ford and Chrysler facilities
received billions of dollars in new investment, not only in response to the companies’
requirements under the Auto Pact but because these firms understood the benefits of
sourcing production in Canada.102
Volvo faced constraints, of course, that largely precluded it from taking more
advantage of its Canadian facility. First, Volvo did not have the benefits of proximity
that the Big Three boasted. Windsor, where much of the Canadian auto industry was
located, was only across the river from Detroit, America’s “Motor City”. Halifax, on
the other hand, was thousands of miles from Sweden – there was no chance of
developing “just-in-time” production techniques or of merging production schedules
and operational plans of Volvo’s Canadian and Swedish facilities, as happened with
the Big Three after 1965. By the 1990s, the Halifax operation remained a far-flung
outpost of the company, a remnant of a bygone era where a niche independent auto
company such as Volvo had attempted to build its own multinational presence.103
While Volvo’s other “foreign” plants established during this period – Ghent, Belgium
in 1965 and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 1967 – continued to function, their survival
reflected local considerations (European integration and tariff requirements to be in
Southeast Asia) rather than any coherent international policy.
Second, Volvo’s Halifax plant was caught in a proverbial catch-22. The plant
originated under tariff rules designed for small-scale production for the Canadian
market. It lacked the economies of scale necessary to take full advantage of its Auto
Pact status to export into the U.S. market; doing so required hitting the necessary 50
per cent North American regional content guarantees under the agreement, a
prohibitively expensive undertaking for a company of Volvo’s size at a plant of
Halifax’s stature. Volvo’s corporate managers likely saw little benefit in boosting
investment or production in a facility that was originally intended as a beachhead into
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the Canadian market and which remained as such for all of its existence. With the
concessions and incentives provided by the federal, provincial and municipal
governments, it cost the company little to maintain the facility. In return for these
generous inducements, Volvo provided nominal employment and minimal Canadian
value added while gaining a measure of good corporate citizenship.
Indeed, in providing continued preferential treatment, both the federal and
provincial governments showed that they could only do so much in an automotive
industry that experienced so much change during the period under examination. Tariff
concessions and plants built for Volvo did provide an incentive for the company to set
up operations in Nova Scotia but governments could not control the market or the
management decisions of the company. In this case, state intervention was beneficial
in attracting the firm to Nova Scotia but could do little after the plant was established
in the face of the vagaries of the marketplace or the quickly changing world auto
industry. State intervention can be successful, but it can only be as successful as the
partners with which it is dealing.
At its core, the departure of Volvo from Halifax did not happen because Nova
Scotia was a poor choice for an auto plant or because Nova Scotia auto workers were
not capable or effective. Nor did Volvo’s departure hinge upon unrealistic tariff rules
or overly demanding content regulations by the federal government. While many of
the location and labour difficulties the plant faced certainly curtailed the growth of its
production, Volvo left Halifax because of a rapidly changing world automotive
industry, because it could not take advantage of new trade regimes to exploit its
largest market, and because the economies of scale, which were realistic in 1963, were
utterly unrealistic in 1998.
In the end, the plant itself may not have been a success, but it did provide
employment for hundreds of workers in the Halifax area for over three decades. The
plant takeover illustrates how valued those jobs were by the employees. As Anders
Sandberg noted before the closure of the facility, “There are several reasons why
Volvo workers stay in what appear to be less than satisfying jobs. The wages are high
by Nova Scotia standards. There is little else to do. The workers are relatively old and
know few other skills; in 1994, the average age was close to 50 years. These are facts
of which the workers are critically aware and constantly reminded by
management”.104 For these people, Volvo’s Halifax venture had nothing to do with
corporate exploitation: the company provided jobs where none had existed before, and
the governments’ willingness to use taxpayer funds to provide incentives was not a
case of Volvo “taking advantage” of Canadian largesse but a genuine effort at
economic development that did not, in the end, have a lasting effect.
In the long run, the battle over the closure of Volvo Halifax may have been moot.
In 1998 the Ford Motor Company purchased the auto assembly operations of Volvo
of Sweden. With the new arrangement, it is highly unlikely that Ford would have
continued to operate the facility, given that they could import Volvo cars directly from
Sweden into the United States duty-free under the Auto Pact because of the change of
ownership. Even the demise of the Auto Pact, following the 2000 World Trade
Organization ruling that the agreement was contrary to international trade laws, would
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have likely led to the end of the plant. Without the preferential tariff treatment
afforded by the agreement, Volvo would not have continued to build cars at its tiny
Canadian operation. Corporate consolidation and the globalization of the automotive
industry would have quickly shuttered the plant, something that sporadic production
and uncertain facilities had not managed to do in nearly four decades.
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